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The article considers the operation o f the law o f defamation in 
the functional setting o f municipal politics. It examines the courts’ 
handling o f the crucial balance between freedom o f  speech and  
the protection o f  the individual from  unfair comment and criticism 
in a number o f recent cases involving municipal corporations 
and politicians. It also discusses the application o f the substantive 
elements o f the defamation action and the defences and the accom­
modations o f  the law o f  defamation to the municipal corporate 
entity.
Dans cet article, Vauteur examine l'application du droit de la d if­
fam ation dans le contexte de la politique municipale et analyse, à 
la lumière de quelques décisions récentes mettant en cause des 
municipalités et politiciens, la démarche des tiibunaux face à 
Vimpérative nécessité de concilier liberté de parole et droit de 
l'individu à être protégé contre des imputations ou critiques injustifiées. 
L'article examine également l'application des éléments essentiels 
de l'action en diffamation et des moyens de défense ainsi que 
l'adaptation du droit de la diffamation aux municipalités.
THE “STING” AND LOCAL POLITICS
T he business o f  municipalities has always been a relatively fertile 
field for defam ation actions. T h e  jurisprudence o f recent years suggests 
that there  has been no decrease in the volume o f litigation generated in 
the arena o f  m unicipal politics. Indeed, there has been a series o f 
decisions in defam ation cases involving municipalities, mayors and 
m unicipal councillors which has gone some way towards clarifying the 
application o f  the law o f  defam ation to the municipal entity. At the same 
time there has been a num ber o f cases involving municipal politicians 
which have involved fundam ental questions about the p roper balance 
between free speech and the protection o f  the individual from  calum ny 
which should be struc k within the* general law o f defam ation
T h e com parative frequency o f defam ation actions in the field o f  
m unicipal politics has two basic o f explanations. T he  first flows from  the 
principles o f defam ation law itself. For m any years now it has been well 
established that the meetings o f m unicipal councils, unlike those o f 
Parliam ent and  o f the provincial legislatures, are not occasions o f 
absolute privilege in which even statem ents which are patently and 
knowlingly false and which are prom pted  by malice o r spite fall within
124 U.N.B. LAW JOURNAL  •  REVUE DE DROIT U.N.-B.
the protection afforded by the privilege.1 T he  m unicipal council, has the 
benefit o f only a qualified privilege for its deliberations, requiring  an 
honest belief in the tru th  o f statem ents m ade and an absence o f malice.2 
Accordingly, statem ents m ade in council may be adjudged defam atory 
and the au thor found liable. O ne suspects that m em bers o f the federal 
Parliam ent and provincial legislatures are a good deal m ore circumspect 
about the setting in which they make strong statem ents than their 
municipal counterparts because o f absolute privilege.3 A second 
explanation is the lack o f  party affiliations in local politics. Political life 
has a tendency to attract strong personalities at all levels, but on the 
federal and provincial planes individual feeling and bias is often 
tem pered  by party discipline and the need to subm erge individual 
frustration  in the collective interest. In municipal governm ent the only 
constraint is that which the individual sets for himself. A third is the fact 
that local politicians are perceived by the citizen as affecting his day to 
dav life m ore directly and intimately than their federal o r provincial 
counterparts. T he result is sometimes an intensity o f feeling on issues 
whic h makes for a strong brand o f criticism.
T h e  purpose o f  this paper is two-fold. It exam ines the special rules 
relating to defam ation which flow from  the fact that the municipal 
corporation is not a natural person and must act th rough  hum an agents; 
and it attem pts to show the way in which the courts attem pt to strike a 
balance between the candid exchange o f  opinion on m atters o f public 
interest on the one hand and the protection o f the individual from 
unfair com m ent o r criticism on the o ther. In the latter context, 
particular attention is paid to the courts’ handling o f the defences o f 
qualified privilege, and fair com m ent.
DEFAMATION AT CITY HALL: WHO CAN SUE AND BE SUED?
Defamation is by its natu re  a to rt action which has a personal quality 
to it. Historically it developed as a m eans whereby individuals could 
protect o r salvage their reputations from unfair and false im putations 
m ade by o ther individuals. In time, however, the recognition by the 
general law o f  the personality of corporations raised the issue o f 
w hether these entities had the capacity to defam e and be defam ed.
It was accepted in the nineteenth  century that a commercial 
corporation could be adjudged personally liable for a defam atory
♦l.L.B., 1962 (St.Andrews), 1.1..M., 1964 (L ondon), LL.M., 1970, (M ichigan). I)ean o f  Law, University o f  
( Calgary.
'L stablished in Royal Aqiuirium tÿ Summer & Winter Garden Society v. Parkinson, [1892] 1 Q.B. 431 (C.A.). 
‘See C.atlev on Libel and Slander, (7th ed.), at 419.
' The d angers  o f  speaking candidlv outside the  H ouse may not be as great in light o f  the  decision in 
Stopjorth v. Goyer (1979), 8 C .C .L .T . 172 (O nt. C.A.).
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statem ent,4 and it was soon after established that what was tru e  o f  a 
commercial corporation was also tru e  o f a municipal corporation. T h u s 
in the early O ntario  case o f  M cLay v. The Corporation o f  the County of 
Bruce5 a municipality was found liable in defam ation when the m em bers 
o f council published, in pam phlets and in the m inutes o f council, 
material which im pugned the honesty o f  the plaintiff registrar o f  deeds 
for the municipality. Implicit in the jud g em en t is the assum ption that 
the m em bers o f the council were not acting in their individual capacities, 
but as a body corporate carrying out its purposes u n d er statute.
Until recently, however, it had not been clear that a m unicipal 
corporation could sue for defam ation. T h e  right o f #a commercial 
corporation to sue for defam ation reflecting upon the conduct o f  its 
business was established firmly in C anada in 1915 in the case o f  Price v. 
Chicoutimi Pulp  C o.,6 but the position o f  municipal corporations was 
thought to be as set out in Manchester Corp. v. W illiam s7 in which the 
English Divisional C ourt concluded that, while a libel action might be 
brought by a corporation in relation to property, this was not possible 
where the libel affected personal reputation. T his uncertainty may have 
been resolved by a recent British Columbia decision, Prince George v. 
British Columbia Television System L td . 8 Mr. Justice Toy found that a 
m unicipal corporation could sue in defam ation for statem ents suggesting 
that it, “through its council and its o ther servants and agents had been 
corrup t, dishonest, fraudulent, inefficient and unfit to discharge its 
duties”.
A municipal corporation, although it lacks many indicia and attributes of a 
natural person, enjoys a reputation delineated by those powers and 
obligations created by the M unicipal Act, the functions that it actually engages 
in and the manner in which it performs those functions.9
T h e  recognition o f  a right in a municipal corporation to sue in 
defam ation may seem to be an innocuous developm ent and the logical 
correlative to allowing a defam ation action against such a body. T h ere  
are, however, im portant policy considerations which gainsay extending 
the law in this way. In reaching his decision in the Prince George case. 
Toy J . found persuasive Bogner Regis U.D.C. v. Cam pion10-, a recent 
English decision in which a m unicipal corporation successfully sued an 
individual for defam ation. T h e  decision in that case is one which should
4S e t e.g., Whitfield v. South Eastern Rly. Co. (1858), 120 E.R. 451 (Q.B.).
5( 1887), 14 O.L..R. 398 (C.P.D.).
•(1915), 51 S.C.R. 179 (S.C.C.).
7[ 1891J I Q.B. 94 (Div. Ct.).
"(1978), 85 D.L.R. (3d) 755 (B.C.S.C.).
*lbid., at 758.
,0[ 1972] 2 All L.R. 61 (Q.B.).
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give pause to those who would argue that an artificial person is in no 
d ifferen t position from the natural person in term s o f the effect o f  a 
defam atory statem ent, and that it is only reasonable that both should 
have the right to sue.
T h e  defendant, Mr. Cam pion, a ratepayer, had engaged in an 
extended cam paign o f  very forceful and pungent criticism o f  the local 
council. This included the writing o f  highly critical letters to the editor 
o f the local new spaper, and appearances on television in which he 
com plained bitterly o f  the conduct o f  council and its mem bers. At a 
subsequent m eeting o f  local ratepayers, the defendan t distributed a 
leaflet to those attending. In this docum ent he m ade fu rth e r strong 
attacks on council and individual m em bers. He alleged that the business 
o f council had been carried on in a dictatorial, undem ocratic m anner, 
and that the council had brought pressure to bear on the ed ito r o f  the 
local new spaper to repress a free press and free speech. He went on to 
assert that many council m em bers had personal axes to grind and as a 
result council was not carrying out the electors’ wishes. In conclusion he 
m aintained that council’s policy o f destroying peoples homes as “un fit” 
was dishonest when the land was to be used for tourist developm ents. 
He was sued for libel by the municipal corporation.
Brown J. noted that both trad ing  corporations and trade unions had 
been recognized as enjoying the right to sue in defam ation. Seeing no 
difference between the trad ing  reputation o f a commercial corporation 
and the business reputation o f  a trade union on the one hand, and the 
governing reputation o f a m unicipal corporation on the o ther, he 
determ ined  that it was legitimate for the latter to sue for a libel affecting 
its personal reputation. He went on to find that the defences o f  qualified 
privilege and fair com m ent were not m ade out by the defendant and 
that the latter was guilty o f libelling the plaintiff. He was o rdered  to pay 
£2,000 dam ages and costs. T h e  latter, it seems, am ounted to som ething 
in the o rd e r o f  £30 ,000 .“
T h e  m ajor problem  with this decision is that it places a very 
significant curb on the right o f  the individual citizen to criticize 
governm ent. As Professor Weir has so ably argued, it is w rong that any 
artificial person, which by definition cannot enjoy feelings and social 
relations in the norm al sense and cannot suffer loss to those interests, 
should have the benefit o f a legal action which limits the right o f  free 
speech, but does so on the assum ption that a natural person would 
suffer em barrassm ent and a lowering o f reputation in the m inds o f  his 
peers from  harsh and u n tru e  statem ents.12 T he  m ore so is it w rong
" T h e  info rm ation  as to  costs is revealed in W eir, "Case C om m ent — Local A uthority  v. Critical
R atepayer — A Suit in D efam ation”, (1972) 30 Camb. L.J. 238. Professor W eir also indicated that a 
p rim e reason for the  corpo ra tion  suing ra th e r than  individual councillors, was that legal aid was not 
available fo r defam ation  actions.
,2lbtd. P rofessor W eir suggests tha t a co rpora tion  should only be able to  recover dam ages fo r loss 
actually incu rred  as a result o f  a false statem ent im properly m ade by a d efendan t. T h e  ap p ro p ria te  tort 
action is in jurious falsehood, not defam ation.
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when it is opened up to governm ental bodies and allows them  to chastize 
bothersom e citizens who criticize their policies.
Nor need governments have all the rights o f  individuals; there are two 
reasons for this: the first is that governments are not individuals, and the 
second is that there are some things they, as governments, should have to put 
up with. One o f  the things a government should have to put up with is 
criticism. T he only criticism which government may properly repress is 
criticism which is harmful to the state or public order, and the only proper 
method for such repression is the criminal law. The exclusive use o f  the 
criminal law in such cases is safer for the citizen and the citizenry because its 
use attracts attention by showing that the relations o f  state and citizen are in 
issue, and its processes contain, for that very reason, many safeguards not 
found in private law.13
It is to be hoped that the final word on this m atter has not been spoken 
by the C anadian and English courts. I he blithe acceptance o f  the right 
o f  a municipal corporation to sue in defam ation w ithout an exam ination 
o f  the policy factors which militate against it can only result in an 
unfortunate  confining o f the right o f  free speech. M oreover, the 
decisions in the two cases sit very awkwardly beside the significant 
degree o f  leeway which the House o f  Lords has since allowed to 
municipal politicians to vent their frustrations against each o th e r.14
Since a m unicipal corporation has to art th rough  individuals the 
issue o f  vicarious as well as personal liability is im portant. A lthough a 
defam atory statem ent m ade by an individual em ployed by a municipality 
undoubtedly opens that individual to a personal action by the subject o f 
the statem ent, it may be open to argum ent that the statem ent, having 
been u ttered by the individual in the course o f  carrying out his 
responsibility as an em ployee o f  the corporation, the latter should also 
be open to suit. If loss flows from the statem ent there is no reason why 
the em ployer should be im m une.
It is, however, im portan t to distinguish cases o f  true  vicarious 
liability from  those o f liability through delegation. Municipalities, 
particularly the larger urban  municipalities, will conduct at least part o f  
their business th rough  standing o r special committees. These bodies will 
deal with specific areas o f  local governm ent, such as finance, property 
and  p lanning .15 M unicipalities may also have the power o f  appointing 
boards — for exam ple, parks and recreation boards — with 
responsibility for the provision o f certain m unicipal services.16 Insofar as 
a tortious act, including a defam atory statem ent, is m ade by a com mittee
l4See Horrocks v. Lowe, [1974] I All E.R. 662 (H.L. Eng.).
“ I.F. Rogers, The Law o f Municipal Corporations, (2nd ed.). Vol. I, at 270.
‘•See e.g., Municipal Government Act R.S.A. 1970, c. 246, s. 208; Public Parks Act R.S.O. 1970, c. 384.
>3lbid., at 241.
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o r board for which the municipality is responsible and falls within the 
authority delegated o r granted to it, it is treated by the law as if m ade by 
the municipal corporation itself.17
Vicarious liability, on the o ther hand, depends on the establishm ent 
o f  th ree factors: 1) a master-servant relationship must exist; 2) the 
servant must be carrying ou t the duties o f the municipal authority; 3) 
the tort must have been com m itted d u rin g  the course o f and within the 
scope o f the servant’s em ploym ent with the municipality. As far as 
actions for defam ation are concerned, it is unlikely that a municipality 
would be accounted liable for the ill-considered statem ents o f the m ayor 
and councillors as individuals. While they may be considered in popular 
parlance as ‘servants o f the people’ they are not at law servants o r 
employees o f  the cor potation. They are ra ther its directors, and unless 
they are acting in their corporate capacity o r as official representatives 
o f the corporation in m aking statem ents, liability will be strictly personal. 
O n the o ther hand, any em ployee o f the municipality or o f one o f its 
departm ents o r o f a body enjoying delegated authority from  the 
corporation, may generate the vicarious liability o f  the corporation for 
his statem ents. Normally an em ployee is defined as one who is u nder a 
contract o f service to the em ployer. It makes no difference w hether the 
em ployee is professional o r non-professional. T he  question is w hether 
the individual is part o f the m aster’s organization and subject to his 
overall adm inistrative control, not w hether his work is closely supervised 
o r n o t.19
T h e  requirem ent that the servant m ust be carrying out the duties o f 
the municipal authority  is designed to protect the municipal corporation 
when an em ployee may be acting un d er the authority  o f some o ther 
level o f governm ent. T his m ight well be the case, for instance, with a 
sanitary engineer norm ally employed by the city, but acting in the 
circum stances on behalf o f  the Board o f Health u nder Public Health 
Legislation.20
T h e notion that the tort m ust be com m itted du ring  the course o f 
and within the scope o f the servant’s em ploym ent serves to distinguish 
cases where the servant is operating  in an em ploym ent or representative
17 T here a re  o f  course  local boards which are  constitu ted  as corporations separately from  the  m unicipal 
corporation . T o rtio u s  liability in such cases applies only to the  local board, not to the m unicipality. See
Rogers, supra footnote  15, Vol. 2, at 1429-33.
'"See e.g., Gaul v. Ellice (1902), 3 O .L.R . 438 (O nt. C.A.) at 444.
■'Fleming, The Law o f Torts, (5th ed.), at 360-2.
l0T h e  weight o f  au tho rity  seems to be that an official who is appointed  as a public officer by virtue o f
provincial legislation, w hether o r not the  m unicipality selects him , is not a servant o f  the  municipality. 
See e.g., McKenzie v. C.hilliwack (1910), 14 W.L.R. 97 (B.C.S.C.); Delbndge v. Brantford (1917), 40 O.L.R. 
443 (O nt. C .\.) ;N u h a ll  v. Windsor (1926), 59 O .L.R . 618 (O nt. C .A.); Mead v. Marquts R.M ., [1928] 2 D.L.R. 
524 (Sask. Q.B y.Brefmer v. Edmonton, [1947] 2 D.L.R. 877 (Alta. S .C .),aff. [1948] 2 D.L.R. 560 (Alta. A.D.); 
Burkard v. Camrose (1953), 8 W.W.R. (N.S.) 401 (Alta. D.C.). Legislative provision is also som etim es m ade 
to  af firm  this, see e.g.. Municipal Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 246, s. 402.
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capacity, and those where he is acting independently  for his own 
purposes and benefit. T his general distinction has never been 
particularly easy to make because a servant may be ostensibly working in 
an em ploym ent situation, but actually fu rthering  o r pursuing his own 
private and contrary interests. T h e  classic case is the b artender who, 
ra th e r than restraining a recalcitrant custom er, vents his passion by 
violently assaulting him, causing serious bodily in jury .21
In some tort actions, most notably in negligence, the tendency o f  the 
courts has been to treat the notion o f scope o f em ploym ent liberally and 
to go so far as to say that as long as the servant is acting within the 
general authority  given him, it does not m atter that he goes about his 
business negligently, even if it is in an unauthorized fashion.22 Even if 
he carries ou t his duties in a way in which he causes wilful harm  to 
another, the m aster may still be liable if he is acting in his m aster’s 
interests and if the degree o f im propriety does not convert it into an act 
o f  personal revenge o r spite.23
With defam ation the approach o f the courts has been to 
circum scribe m ore closely the notion o f course o f  em ploym ent. T h ere  is 
no doubt that a corporation may be vicariously liable for defam atory 
rem arks m ade by its servants. So in Harrison x .J o y  O il L td . 24 it was held 
that the defendant com pany was liable for the slanderous rem arks o f  its 
superin tenden t o f service stations in which he accused the plaintiff, a 
service station m anager, o f m isappropriation o f  funds. It was found to 
be the superin tenden t’s duty to obtain a daily repo rt from each service 
station and to see that the state o f  affairs at each was satisfactory. T he  
statem ents were thus m ade within the superin tenden t’s authority  as a 
representative o f  the company. However, the courts show' distinct 
hesitation automatically to equate authority to m ake statem ents which 
may be defam atory w ith authority to com m unicate. In effect, they have 
required  that the statem ent must be o f a kind, and connected with, a 
subject m atter about which the servant is authorized to make statem ents. 
In Glasgow Corporation v. Lorimer,25 for example, the House o f Lords 
held that a municipal corporation was not liable for slander com m itted 
by a city tax collector when he accused the plaintiff o f  altering a receipt 
and com m itting forgery. In the opinion o f their Lordships the servant 
had neither the express nor the implied authority to express an opinion 
on a m atter o f  this nature. T he  inference is that he could explain his 
purpose and in terpre t the statem ent o f account, but no more.
*‘See e.g., Griggs v. Southside Hotel, [1947] 4 D.L.R. 49 (Ont. C.A.). 
“ Fleming, The Im w  o f Torts, (5th ed.), at 364-7.
24[ 1938] 4 D.L.R. 360 (Ont. C.A.).
” [1911] A C . 209 (H I:. Scot.).
"Ibid., at 370-3.
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T his judicial caution reflects a concern not to describe unreasonably 
wide perim eters for the operation o f vicarious liability in the case o f a 
tort in which the professional shades so easily into the personal. As 
Atiyah has rem arked:
This narrow view is probably inevitable because an application o f a broad 
approach demonstrated by the courts when dealing with other torts would 
produce grotesque results in this field. It could plausibly be said that any 
servant who is required to say anything in the course o f  performing his duties 
is merely doing an authorized act in an improper way when he slanders 
som eone and thus justify holding the master liable. Clearly, this will not 
do . . . ,2S
N otw ithstanding the hesitant approach adopted  by the courts, there are 
clear cases in which vicarious liability is likely to attach. T he  most 
obvious situations are those in which the servant has a broad authority  
and discretion to make statem ents within the organizational system o f 
the corporation. Commissioners, town clerks, and m unicipal solicitors 
are good examples. M oreover, it is, as Atiyah suggests, easier to make 
the link when the com m unication is w ritten, as it is m ore likely to fall 
within the servant’s express or implied au thority .27
THE LIMITS OF MUNICIPAL DEFAMATION
T h e determ ination o f w hether words, spoken o r written, are capable 
o f  a defam atory m eaning in a case involving a municipality, its officers 
or employees, proceeds within the fram ew ork o f  general legal principles. 
T hese principles are perhaps most clearly stated by Mr. Justice Egbert o f 
the Alberta Suprem e C ourt in his address to the ju ry  in Willows v. 
W illiams.28 T h e  case involved allegedly slanderous statem ents m ade at a 
hospital board m eeting by the chairm an concerning the character o f  an 
applicant for the position o f hospital m atron. T h e  judge stated:
Defamation consists in the publication without justification o f  a false and 
defamatory statement regarding some other party. Defamation may consist 
either in libel or slander. In libel the defamatory statement is made in some 
visible and permanent form and in slander it is made in spoken words, or in 
some other transitory form. A defamatory statement is one which has a 
tendency to injure the reputation o f  the person to whom it refers, which 
lowers him in the estimation o f  the right thinking members o f  society, and in 
particular which causes him to be regarded with feelings o f  hatred, contempt, 
ridicule, fear, dislike or disesteem. I would point out to you that mere insult 
or vulgar abuse does not amount to defamation because these things are only 
offensive to a man’s dignity and do not lower him in the regard in which he is 
held by other members o f  stxiety. I'he law says that any man is entitled to his 
reputation unimpaired by defamatory attacks by a third person, and
2®Ativah, Vicarious Liability in the Law o f Tarts (L ondon: B utterw orths, 1967), at 274.
21lbul.. at 275.
**(1951), 2 W .W.R. (N.S.) 657 (Alta. I I).).
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published statements which tend to destroy or impair that reputation are 
actionable. T he test o f  the defamatory nature o f  a statement is its tendency to 
excite against the plaintiff the adverse opinion or feelings o f  other persons.
T he real test is: “Would the words tend to lower the plaintiff in the 
estimation o f  right thinking members o f  society generally?”29
T h e determ ination  o f w hether a statem ent tends to lower the 
p lain tiff in the estim ation o f  right thinking m em bers o f society is 
sometimes attended  with difficulty. T his is particularly true  when the 
words in and o f themselves may appear unexceptional. W here the words 
clearly im pute dishonesty, co rrup t motives, immorality and the like to a 
person few problem s arise with characterization.30 However, where the 
words are less colourful o r less obviously vindictive m uch will depend on 
the circum stances in which the statem ent is made. For exam ple, words 
which m ight be characterized as m ere insult o r vulgar abuse in a heated 
council debate may lose that character when they are used as the basis 
for a b roader ranging attack in the com m unity th rough  the media. T hus 
in the recent case o f Loan v. M acLean31 the plaintiff, an alderm an and 
local teacher, brought a successful defam ation action against the m ayor 
o f the municipality when the latter, in a recorded telephone 
conversation with a rep o rte r for a local T .V . station, re ferred  variously 
to the plainfiff as “one o f  the biggest jokes Peachland has had for a long 
while”, “stupid”, “out o f  his d ep th ”, “a bo th er”. He also identified him as 
a teacher. Kirke Smith J. in addressing the issue o f  w hether the words 
were defam atory had this to say:
The words here, spoken o f  a high school teacher with specific reference to his 
profession, are to me clearly disparaging. They were spoken, and broadcast, 
in a comparatively small community, where every one knows everyone else’s 
business, and it seems to me in those circumstances, where right thinking 
persons in that community could and probably would interpret them as 
defamatory, there must be legal liability.32
In dealing with the defence o f  qualified privilege, the ju d g e  referred  
expressly to the fact that the words had not been spoken at the council 
m eeting, but in the com m unity at large.
While the C ourts are obviously concerned with seeing that 
m unicipal politicians do not transcend the bounds o f propriety in their 
attacks on others, they are conscious o f  the need to distinguish m ere 
strong criticism from statem ents dam aging to a person’s reputation. In
2tIbid., at 658. In  a n um ber o f  C anad ian  jurisdictions the historical distinction between libel and  slander 
has been abolished; i.e., A lberta, M anitoba, Yukon T errito ry .
30A classic exam ple from  W estern C anadian  ju risp rudence  is Minchm  v. Samis (1913), 4 W .W.R. 891 
(Alla. A.I).) in which the  w ords “ I do  not blam e A lderm an M inchin for rep resen ting  his constituents: it 
is a well known fact tha t he had Jo h n n y  Reid carting  all the  whores, pim ps and undesirable voters in 
the  city lo vote fo r him and that was how he was elected" w ere ad judged  to be slanderous as showing "a 
lack o f  integrity".
3I( 1975), 58 D.L.R. (3d) 228 (B.C.S.C.).
3tlbid., at 231.
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Faminow v. R eid33 the plaintiff was a barrister appearing  before a city 
council representing residents opposed to the location o f a boarding 
hom e for children in the neighbourhood. At a public meeting called by 
the municipality to discuss a by-law am endm ent which would 
accom m odate the proposed use, the plaintiff failed to reveal the contents 
o f  two letters from residents which were contrary  to the developm ent 
and would have adversely affected the 60% consent required from  
neighbouring residents. T h e  by-law was passed th rough  two readings at 
that m eeting. At a subsequent council m eeting when the by-law came up  
for final reading, the plaintiff was invited to speak. He endeavoured at 
that stage to introduce the two letters. T h e  defendant, the mayor, 
thereupon ruled the letters out o f  o rder, m aintaining that they should 
have been presented at the earlier public hearing. M oreover he 
rem arked “This is a very high-handed way o f doing business”. Mr. 
Justice Ruttan concluded that the use o f the word “high-handed” was 
not defam atory.
T he normal meaning, the dictionary meaning, is “overbearing, arrogant or 
arbitrary", “acting with a high hand”. Such a comment may reflect the 
exasperation o f  a mayor and Council or the opinion o f  a judge in court to a 
counsel’s over-zealous representation but is no reflection on the plaintiff with 
respect to his services to his client or his professional character and ability.34
His Lordship went on to say that he could find no innuendo in the 
words used suggesting that the plaintiff was unscrupulous, dishonest in 
his conduct, unfit to represent his clients, o r  had acted in a m anner 
unbecom ing to his professional calling.
T h ere  is evidence to suggest that in the arena o f municipal politics 
the courts expect some degree o f fortitude from  the politicians in facing 
criticism, even strong criticism, when it takes place in council meetings 
or even where it appears in the colum ns o f  the press. T he fortitude 
which is dem anded will be greater w here su rround ing  circumstances 
suggest that criticism is jutified. An interesting case in this regard is Rice 
Sheppard v. Bulletin Co. L td .36 Following a judicial inquiry into the 
conduct o f civic governm ent in Edm onton which determ ined that 
som ething was seriously wrong, particularly with the enforcem ent o f the 
crim inal law in the city, the defendan t new spaper published a series o f 
articles on the state o f  the city’s affairs. In the course o f one o f the 
articles, the plaintiff, a city alderm an, was associated with the 
“adm inistration party” which the new spaper claimed had condoned and 
encouraged crim e and vice in the city. T h e  article also went on to 
suggest that the plaintiff and others had benefited financially from  
contracts m ade while the “Tam m any type” adm inistration was in power.
“ (1972). 24 1)1 R Ckl) 554 (B.C.S.C.).
3ilbui.. ai 558.
3i(l917), 55 S.C.R. 454, per Davies ]. at 457-66.
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A majority o f the Suprem e C ourt o f Canada, while accepting that a 
person, by moving from  private life into the public arena, did not forfeit 
his right to protection from  statem ents unfairly reflecting on his 
personal reputation, felt that the m ere association o f the plaintiff with a 
Tam m any regim e was not sufficient to im pute personal corruption to 
him. M oreover, in light o f the background circumstances, the statem ents 
in the paper had not transgressed the bounds o f fair com m ent.
In the context o f  a tort action in which what was said, by whom and 
to whom, and what is m eant, are o f vital significance, evidential 
problems often loom large. T h eir im portance is highlighted in the 
Suprem e C ourt decision in Fraser v. Sykes.36 T he defendant, the then 
Mayor o f Calgary, charged in two public statem ents that city council had 
been misled by a firm o f developers and their legal representative into 
believing that it was a condition o f proceeding with a commercial 
developm ent that an adjacent street not be blocked off. T h e  mayor 
claimed that he had previous undertakings from the developers that this 
was not a difficulty. In his com m ents he also implied that the plaintiff, 
the legal representative, had not followed instructions. A slender 
majority o f the Suprem e C ourt o f Canada agreed with the judgem ents 
o f the two lower courts that these words were defam atory o f the plaintiff 
and injurious to his reputation. They were satisfied with the conclusion 
reached by the lower courts largely on the basis o f  the p lain tiffs 
evidence that the defendant had m isrepresented the background facts 
and that no undertak ing  had been m ade by the developers. T he  
minority in the Suprem e C ourt found the evidence o f  the defendant 
m ore compelling, particularly in light o f  the fact that, in their opinion, it 
was uncontradicted as to the previous undertaking o f the developers. In 
the light o f that evidence, they could not see how the statem ents could 
be classified as defam atory o f the plaintiff. Reading the decisions o f 
Justices Ritchie and Laskin one cannot help feeling that he is reading 
the facts o f two differen t cases. T he very real division o f opinion in the 
Suprem e C ourt in this case points out the im portance o f  the courts 
having as com plete a record o f the background facts as possible.
DEFENDING A DEFAMATION ACTION FROM THE MUNICIPAL 
ARENA
Establishing that a statem ent is defam atory does not necessarily 
conclude the question o f liability. T he defendant may have a defence 
available to him which, if successfully pleased, will relieve him of that 
liability. T he most im portant defence as far as the conduct o f  municipal 
governm ent is concerned is that o f  qualified privilege. T he perim eters of
3*[1‘)74] S.C.R. 526.
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and the rationale for this defence have their most eloquent statem ent in 
the judgem ent o f Lord Diplock in Horrocks v. Lowe37 which involved a 
defam atory statem ent at a municipal council meeting:
My Lords, as a general rule, English law gives effect to the ninth 
Commandment that a man shall not speak evil falsely o f  his neighbour. It 
supplies a temporal sanction: if he cannot prove that defamatory matter 
which he published was true he is liable in damages to whomsoever he has 
defamed . . . .  T he public interest that the law should provide an effective 
means whereby a man can vindicate his reputation against calumny, has 
nevertheless to be accommodated to the competing public interest in 
permitting men to communicate frankly and freely with one another about 
matters with respect to which the law recognizes that they have a duty to 
perform or an interest to protect in doing so. What is published in good faith 
on matters o f  these kinds is published on a privileged occasion. It is not 
actionable even though it be defamatory and turns out to be untrue. . . .  It is 
lost if the occasion which gives rise to it is misused. For in all cases o f  
qualified privilege there is some special reason o f public policy why the law 
accords immunity from suit — the existence o f  some public or private duty, 
whether legal or moral, on the part o f  the maker o f  the defamatory statement 
which justifies his communicating it or some interest o f  his own which he is 
entitled to protect by doing so. If he uses the occasion for some other reason 
he loses the protection o f  the privilege.38
In the case o f municipal governm ent the special reason o f public policy 
is clear. It is the need to allow those involved in governm ent to 
com m unicate freely and forthrightly with each o ther in prom oting the 
public welfare. It is taken as an article o f  faith in o u r dem ocratic system 
o f governm ent that m ore is to be gained by honest and candid 
statem ents o f opinion and criticism than by timidity and circumlocution. 
As Lord Diplock points out “they may be swayed by strong political 
prejudice, they may be obstinate and pig headed, stupid and obtuse; but 
they were chosen by the electors to speak their minds on m atters o f  local 
concern . . ,”39.
In a succession o f cases the courts have recognized that a num ber o f 
phases o f and relationships within municipal governm ent are occasions 
o f  qualified privilege. From w hat has been said already it is clear that 
the m eetings o f m unicipal council enjoy the privilege.40 W hether the 
statem ent m ade in council reflects adversely on a fellow councillor or a 
citizen, as long as it is in the context o f  a m atter o f issue o f public 




4,11 he C anadian  lo u rts  have followed the English case of Royal Aquanum  v. Parkinson, [1892] I <j.B. 431 
((..A.) which firm ly established tha t the  privilege is qualified and not absolute. See e.g. Edwards v. 
Cmtlman, (1928) 3 D.L.R 187 (B.C.S.C.). O ne has to conclude that courts feel that the  deliberation of 
m unu ipal to u m ils  d o  not em brace the  im portant m atters o f  state and  national and provincial policies 
which tHvupv the federal parliam ent and  provincial legislatures and which w arrant absolute privilege.
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apply.41 T h e  privilege is not confined to the m eetings o f council. It 
extends to the meetings o f com mittees and boards to which a 
m unicipality has delegated functions. T h u s in an old O ntario  case, 
Hopewell v. Kennedy, 42 a statem ent m ade by an alderm an to a library 
com m ittee o f  which he was a m em ber which was defam atory o f a 
contractor working on a library building was held to be privileged. 
Docum entation considered by these bodies, such as agenda, reports and 
m inutes will generally be covered by the privilege.43 It also seems to be 
accepted that it is no im pedim ent to the operation o f  the defence, in 
relation to council and its organs, that meetings are public and that the 
press is presen t.44
C om m unications between officials o r servants o f  the corporation 
and the council and its subordinate organs and am ong officials o r 
servants may also enjoy privilege.45 T he effective flow o f inform ation, 
ideas and opinion within and on behalf o f  the corporation is considered 
essential to its functioning. T h e  necessary qualification here is that the 
parties have a legitimate correlative duty and interest in the 
com m unication o f the statem ent. Qualified privilege may also extend to 
the work o f  consultants retained by the municipality. Thus, in Newton  v. 
City o f Vancouver46, the report o f medical commissioners appointed by 
the city, which was libellous o f the p roprie to r o f a private hospital in 
Vancouver, was held to be privileged.
T h e  ambit o f qualified privilege extends beyond the confines o f  the 
corporation itself. For example, com m unications am ong ratepayers,47 
and between municipal officers and commercial firms doing business in 
the city o r town, have been held to be privileged where a legitimate 
com m on interest exists.48
Having said all o f  this, it is im portant to recognize that there are 
limits to the application o f the defence o f qualified privilege. In the first 
place it has to be recognized that qualified privilege applies to occasions,
■“ See e.g., Horrocks v. Lowe, supra, footnote 14; Edwards v. Galtman, supra, footnote 40; Faminow v. Reid, 
supra, footnote 33; Saitdanl v. Day, [1933] 4 D.L.R. 456 (P.E.I.S.C.).
4I( 1905). 9 O .L.R . 43 (Div. Ct.).
43See e.g., Xowland v. M ow  ton Publishing Co. Ltd., [1952] 4 D.L.R. 808 (N.B.C..A.) a sanitary eng ineer's
repo rt considered  a( local Board o f  H ealth  m eeting.
44See Hopewell v. Kennedy, supra, footnote  42.
45See Nowlan v. Moncton Publishing Co. Ltd., supra, footnote 43.
4®( 1932), 46 B.C.R. 67 (B.C.S.C.).
47See Blagden v. Bennett (1855), 9 O .L.R. 593 (C.P.D.).
4*See Hanna  v. De Blaquiere (1854), U .C .Q.B. 310. (Solicitor rep resen ting  m unicipality to  loan com pany 
dealing  with road contractor); Jones v. Brooks (1974). 45 D.L.R. (3d) 413 (Sask. (j.B .) (m ayor to sales 
m anager o f  com pany wishing to employ agent in town).
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ra th er than the people involved in the occasions. Accordingly, once an 
individual moves outside an occasion in which the law recognizes a duty 
o r interest in com m unicating the privilege is lost.
It is well established in C anada that the fact that a man moves from  
private into public life does not give every one else a privilege to 
underm ine his reputation publicly.49 Unlike the situation in the United 
States, where a qualified privilege exists in relation to public com m ents 
on persons in political life, Canadian law limits its protection to fair 
com m ent on m atters o f proven fact which are o f genuine public interest. 
T his means that public statem ents m ade outside the norm al forum s for 
debate and discussion in municipal governm ent — for exam ple in the 
press, on the air-waves o r at political rallies — are not likely to be 
privileged. In Loan v. M acLean50 the m ayor o f a British Columbian 
m unicipality moved outside the range o f qualified privilege when he 
chose to use as the forum  for abusive com m ents against an alderm an, 
the local radio station ra th er than the council cham ber. Also instructive 
in this regard  is the English case o f De Bnse v. M cCarty and Stepney 
Borough Council.M A com m ittee o f investigation was set up  by the 
d efendan t council to look into allegations that certain employees had 
been engaged in stealing gasoline from  the borough. T h e  report nam ed 
the individuals who had been accused, indicated that the allegation had 
been reiterated, and was vigorously denied by the m en in question. No 
finding was m ade as to the alleged facts, but the com m ittee did 
recom m end that all but one o f the employees be transferred  to o ther 
positions. T h e  report was published in the agenda o f a m eeting o f 
council which was sent to the public libraries in the borough and a copy 
o f which was affixed on o r near the town hall. T h e  C ourt o f Appeal in a 
defam ation action brought by the employees m entioned in the report 
found that, assum ing the report to be defam atory, the defence o f 
qualified privilege failed because at the juncture at which the report was 
published to the ratepayers the council had no duty o r interest in 
com m on with the ratepayers which would justify its publication. By the 
same token the ratepayers at that point in time had no interest in receiving 
o r duty  to receive the report. T h e  court obviously felt that when council 
refers a m atter for study o r investigation to a com m ittee, the report o f the 
latter is a private m atter between the com m ittee and counc il until it has been 
approved and acted upon by the council. Until that point in time the 
ratepayers o r the electorate at large have no right to be inform ed. This 
seems em inently fair and the case should be an object lesson to those 
who might be tem pted to circum vent the norm al processes and 
sequences o f  municipal governm ent in o rd e r to go public on issues.
**Holnnti v Globe is  Mail Ltd., [I WO) S.C.R 203. 
'" ( I>.*7')). r>H 1)1 ..R (3d) 228 (B C S C  ).
•M[1‘M2] I All K R 19 (C.A.).
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The sort o f  problem  which came to the surface in De Buse is now 
com plicated by the fact that meetings o f  municipal councils and their 
com m ittees and boards are public and open to the press. Indeed, in 
several provinces the m edia enjoy statutory qualified privilege for “fair 
and accurate” reports o f  the proceedings o f  municipal councils and 
o ther organs o f m unicipal governm ent.52 T h e  question arises w hether 
qualified privilege m ight be lost when a sensitive and potentially 
defam atory issue is discussed in the council cham ber in public prior to 
action being taken. O ne suspects that the courts on the basis o f previous 
authority  would come down in favour o f  a qualified privilege obtaining, 
on the g round that it is im portant to the public interest that open and 
full debate be sustained. However, one can envisage situations in which 
the m aterial is so sensitive that judicial doubt may creep in. It may be 
instructive to note that in England a statutory qualified privilege attaches 
to agenda items o r particulars which are m ade available to m em bers o f 
the public o r press in relation to meetings which are required  by law to 
be public.53
As Lord Diplock points out in Horrocks v. Lowe54 the defence o f 
qualified privilege is lost if it is abused. In the technical jargon o f the 
law, qualified privilege will be forfeit if malice on the part o f the person 
m aking the defam atory statem ent can be found. The burden  is upon the 
party alleging defam ation to prove malice. W here a person in m aking a 
statem ent has acted in good faith and believes in the tru th  o f what he 
says, then malice will not be found. Conversely where he acts from  base 
motives and does not believe what he says, malice will at least be 
in ferred . It also seems to be settled that where an individual makes a 
statem ent recklessly, not caring w hether it is true or false, malice will be 
im puted to him. Finally, even if a person believes in the tru th  o f what he 
says, he may lose the privilege if his predom inant motives in publication 
are dishonourable; for example, w here he acts out o f spite.55 A good 
exam ple o f a recent case in which a court had little trouble in finding 
evidence o f malice is Drouin v. Gagnon . 56 T h e  plaintiff and defendant 
were ratepayers appearing  at a m eeting o f  a rural m unicipality in 
relation to a proposal for an access alley from  the street to the p lain tiffs
i2The Def amation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 87, s. 10(1); Libel and Slander Act, R.S.S. 1965, c. 107, ss. 10 and  I I ;  
Libel and Slander Amendment Act, S.B.C.. 1969, c. 16, s. 2; Libel and Slander Act, R.S.O. 1970. c. 243, ss. 3 
and  4; Defamation Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. D20, ss. 10 and 11; Defamation Act, R.S.N'.B. 1973, i .  D-5, ss. 9 
and  10; Defamation Ordinance, R.O. Y.T. 1971, c. D -l. ss. 10 and 1 1; Defamation Act, R.S.N.S. 1967. c. 72, 
ss. 10 and 13.
S3Public Bodies (Admissions to Meetings) Act (1960). (8 & 9 Eliz. 11), s. 1(5).
i iSupra, footnote  14.
isSee Williams, The Law o f Defamation (T oronto : B uttenvorths, 1976), at 75-106, fo r general discussion 
o f  qualified privilege.
5i(1975), 58 D.L.R. (3d) 428 (Alta. T .D .). A no ther exam ple is Paul v. Van H ull (1962), 36 D.L.R. (2d) 
639 (Man. Q .B .) in which two m unicipal councillors and a jou rna lis t sent letters defam atory  o l o th e r 
m em bers o f  council to a provincial cabinet m inister and to the  press. The charges contained  there in  
were com pletely unsubstantiated .
138 U.N.B. LAW JOURNAL  •  REVUE DE DROIT U.N.-B.
property. In the course o f  the m eeting the defendant addressed the 
plain tiff and stated that the reason he had put a fence between their lots 
was to stop teenagers com ing on his premises with whiskey and liquor 
obtained from the p lain tiffs establishm ent. C hief Justice Milvain o f the 
Alberta Suprem e C ourt T rial Division found that the words were 
defam atory as suggesting that the plaintiff was illegally supplying liquor 
to juveniles and that the statem ents were m ade maliciously. T hey had no 
connection with the business before the council. M oreover, the 
defendan t had no evidence to substantiate the statem ent.
T h e  limits o f  the interaction o f qualified privilege and malice, while 
easy to state, sometimes give rise to problem s in practice. This is likely to 
be so in the case o f com m unications which are m ade in settings in which 
tem pers are high and political bias is accentuated. Such a setting is 
m unicipal governm ent. What happens with the situation where the person 
m aking a statem ent believes fervently in its tru th , but where his belief is 
a statem ent believes fervently in its tru th , but w here his belief is 
buttressed by his own prejudice and anger? Until recently the answer 
might well have been that he lost the privilege because his prejudice and 
anger outweighed his belief in the tru th  o f what he said.57 T h e  decision 
o f the House o f Lords is Horrocks v. Lowe58 takes a new and refreshing 
approach to the issue proceeding from the premise that free and frank 
discussion in the public forum s o f  governm ent is healthy and that the 
courts should be realistic about the environm ent and the political 
dynamics o f the council cham ber.
A city corporation which had a Conservative majority owned land 
which they leased to the local Conservative Club to allow it to erect a 
club house. This was done in ignorance o f a restrictive covenant which 
attached to the land and which prohibited building on that plot. A 
com pany o f which the plaintiff, a Conservative councillor, was chairm an 
and majority shareholder had the benefit o f  the covenant. When the 
existence (if the covenant was discovered, the plaintiff refused to release 
it because o f detrim ent to adjacent owners, and the work on the club 
house had to be abandoned even though the building was near 
com pletion. As a result the corporation had to pay significant 
com pensation to the Club to allow them  to relocate the building 
elsewhere. At a m eeting o f the town council the defendant, a Labour 
councillor, m ade a speech on the issue in which he strongly criticized the 
plain tiff in term s which were defam atory and untrue. In particular he 
charged that the plaintiff had misled the town, the Leader o f his party 
and  his political and club colleagues. It was clear that the defendant was 
angered  by the whole affair and by the conduct o f the plaintiff and was 
distinctly prejudiced in his reaction to the m atter. T h e ir Lordships held 
that, however prejudiced the defendant had been, o r irrational in
slSuprti, footnote I, at 441 per I.o rd  Lsher M.R.
5"Supru, footnote 14.
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leaping to conclusions which were adverse to the plaintiff, he had 
believed in the tru th  o f  what he said.
T he  judgem en t o f Lord Diplock, speaking for the court, is a m odel 
o f the sort o f  reasoning which is sensitive to the setting in which this 
type o f conflict arises and the realities o f debate and discussion therein. 
He was particularly careful to caution against confusing im proper 
motives and lack o f belief in o r indifference to the tru th:
Judges and juries should, however, be very slow to draw the inference that a 
defendant was so far actuated by improper motives as to deprive him o f  the 
protection o f  the privilege unless they are satisfied that he did not believe that 
what he said or wrote was true or that he was indifferent to its truth or 
falsity. T he motives with which human beings act are mixed. They find it 
difficult to hate the sin but love the sinner. Qualified privilege would be 
illusory, and the public interest that it is meant to serve defeated, if the 
protection which it affords were lost merelv because a person, although acting 
in compliance with a duty or in protection o f  a legitimate interest, disliked the 
person whom he defamed or was indignant at what he believed to be that 
person’s conduct and welcomed the opportunity o f  exposing it. It is only 
where his desire to comply with the relevant dutv or to protect the relevant 
interest plays no significant part in his motives for publishing what he believes 
to be true that “express malice" can properlv be found.59
In defin ing “honest b e lie f’ he takes pains to warn against applying 
standards o f  perfection. T h e  resulting “portra it” o f the defam er who 
acts in good faith prom ises to become a classic statem ent o f the law:
But indifference to the truth o f  what he publishes is not to be equated with 
carelessness, impulsiveness or irrationality in arriving at a positive belief that it 
is true. T he freedom o f speech protected by the law o f  qualified privilege 
may be availed by all sorts and conditions o f  men. In affording to them  
immunity from suit if they have acted in good faith in compliance with a legal 
or moral duty or in protection o f a legitimate interest the law must take them  
as it finds them. In ordinary life it is rare indeed for people to form their 
beliefs by a process o f  logical deduction from facts ascertained bv a rigorous 
search for all available evidence and a judicious assessment o f its probative 
value. In greater or in less degree according to their temperaments, their 
training, their intelligence, they are swayed by prejudice, rely on intuition 
instead o f  reasoning, leap to conclusions on inadequate evidence and fail to 
recognize the cogency o f  material which might cast doubt on o f  the valid it \ of 
the conclusions they reach. But despite the imperfection o f  the mental process 
by which the belief is arrived at it may still be honest', i.e. a positive belief 
that the conclusions they have reached are true. T he law demands no more.80
T h e  House o f Lords in this judgem ent have affirm ed the 
im portance o f the public interest in free and frank com m unication in 
municipal governm ent. T hey have stated plainly that the law should not 
inhibit strong criticism even where it has an intensely partisan and 
irrational flavour to it. In their minds, the alternative would be an
s*lbid., at 670. 
*°lbui., at 069.
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unreasonable restriction on dem ocratic debate. In this w riter’s m ind, the 
case stands as an im portant landm ark in clarifying the ambit o f free 
speech in relation to defam ation.61
T h e  defence o f  qualified privilege applies even though the 
defendant has his facts wrong and his opinion is misguided, unfair and 
unw arranted. It is thus distinguishable from  two o ther defences to 
defam ation, justification and fair com m ent. Justification is raised when 
the defendant claims that the substance o f his statem ent is tru e .62 If 
successfully pleaded the statem ent loses its defam atory quality. By its 
natu re  this defence is difficult to prove, because success depends not 
only on proving that the factual basis for what is said is correct, but also 
that the resulting im putations and innuendos are justified. Unless the 
person m aking the statem ent is in full possession o f  the facts, this is 
likely to be an elusive objective. Occasionally, however, it has been 
pleased successfully in the context o f  defam ation in municipal 
governm ent. T hus in Nixon v. O ’C allaghan63 the O ntario  C ourt o f  Appeal 
sustained this defence when the defendant, the deputy  reeve o f  a 
county, in o rd e r to vindicate his own reputation  from the implication in 
a judicial report that he had been engaged in malversation o f  country 
funds, gave a copy o f a later and personally favourable repo rt together 
with copies o f supporting  affidavits from  employees o f  the county to a 
reporter. T h e  report and the affidavits contained m aterial indicating 
that in fact the plaintiff had been guilty o f m alversation. T h e  court 
found the charge to be “proven to the hilt”.
Fair com m ent is available as defence in a potentially wider range o f 
situations and can sometimes be pleased where qualified privilege is 
unavailable.64 It is o f  interest in the context o f the present paper because 
the prim ary condition for its application is that the statem ent which is 
the subject o f the action must have been m ade on a m atter o f public 
interest. Accordingly, it may be o f utility in the sphere o f  municipal 
politics. O ne finds that it is a defence generally raised by a branch o f the 
media when faced with an action for a statem ent relating to a public 
issue. By statute a new spaper o r broadcaster is entitled to qualified 
privilege for a “fair and accurate” report o f the proceedings o f 
m unicipal councils and  their various organs.65 Once the paper o r 
broascaster moves outside the ambit o f  reporting  and begins to 
com m ent, the qualified privilege is lost and the publisher has to depend  
011 fair com m ent. As has already been noted, the latitude allowed 
municipal politicians u n d er qualified privilege is far w ider, em bracing
*'( l ‘*73). 58 I).l..R . (Sd) 428 (Alla. T .I).).
*2See W illiams, supra, footnote  55, at 117-21.
M(I927] I D .I..R. I 152 (O nt. C.A.).
"■'See Williams, supra, footnote 55, at 11.3-117.
*■'.Supra, footnote 52.
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both fact and com m ent. However, as has also been indicated, there are 
institutional and tem poral limits to qualified privilege, and even 
municipal officials and councillors may find themselves outside its 
protection. Typically this happens when they decide to go public by 
m aking personal statem ents to the m edia outside the council cham ber — 
for exam ple, th rough  the ubiquitous press conference.
In addition to the requirem ent that the m atter be one o f  public 
interest, the defendan t must satisfy two o ther conditions. In the first 
place, the facts upon which the com m ent is based m ust be proven as 
true. If  the facts are w rong then the defence is o f no avail. T his proved 
to be the dow nfaull o f  Mayor Sykes in Fraser v. Sykes. 66 All th ree  courts 
agreed that he had got his facts wrong. Secondly, the com m ent must be 
“fair”. This term  is som ething o f a m isnom er because it does not mean 
“reasonable” com m ent, but com m ent which “any fair m an, however 
prejudiced he may be, however exaggerated o r obstinate his views” 
could have m ade.67 In this sense it comes close to providing the 
protection afforded by qualified privilege. In com m on with qualified 
privilege, the defence is lost if the plain tiff can prove that malice 
actuated the com m ent.
T h e  defence o f  fair com m ent and its application in the context o f 
the relationship between m unicipal politicians and the press, was the 
object o f  discussion and o f a significant cleavage o f  opinion in the 
Suprem e C ourt o f  C anada decision in Chernesskey v. Armadale Publishers 
Ltd . 68 I he plaintiff, a city o f  Saskatoon alderm an, claimed that a letter 
written by two law students to the ed itor o f  the Star Phoenix and 
published in the letters to the ed itor colum n, was defam atory o f  him. In 
the letter written un d er the heading “Racist A ttitude”, the writers 
com m ented on a repo rt carried by the paper earlier, which dealt with a 
petition from white residents opposing the location o f  a native 
rehabilitation centre in their neighbourhood, expressing shock and 
disgust at the rascist attitude reported . Having strongly attacked the 
representative o f  the white residents for his negative attitude towards 
native peoples, they went on to criticize the alderm an for his suggestion 
that pending  clarification o f the zoning situation, the establishm ent 
should cease its operation. They concluded by hoping that the rascist 
resistance exhibited would be replaced by support o f  and encourage­
m ent for the centre. T h e  plaintiff sued the publisher and ed ito r o f  the 
new spaper. An attem pt to implicate the law students as th ird  parties 
proved abortive, and they did not testify. At trial the ju ry  found the 
contents o f  the letter to be defam atory o f the plain tiff and dam ages o f 
$25,000 were aw arded to him. T h e  trial judge did not put the defence
‘ •[1974] S.C.R. 526.
*7M rnva lf v. Carson (1887), 20 (j.B.L). 275, per Lord Ksher M.R. ai 281. 
•*(1979), 7 C .C .L .T . 69 (S.C.C.).
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o f fair com m ent to the jury on the ground that there was no evidence 
that the words com plained o f expressed the honest opinion o f anyone, 
not the writers o f the letter, o r any m em ber o f the editorial staff o f the 
new spaper o r the publisher. T h e  majority o f the Saskatchewan C ourt o f  
Appeal concluded that the trial judge had erred  in w ithholding the 
defence o f fair com m ent from the jury. O n the facts, the condition o f 
the defence, including “honest b e lie f’ might have been met. Bayda J.A ., 
in particular, stressed that where a new spaper does not hold the 
opinions expressed in the writings but honestly believes that they 
repressed the genuine opinions o f the writer, the defence o f fair 
com m ent will succeed in the absence o f  malice on the part o f  the 
newspaper. A new trial was ordered.
O n appeal to the Suprem e C ourt, the decision o f the trial ju d g e  was 
restored and the findings as to defam ation and dam ages affirm ed. T h e  
m ajority and m inority opinions raise in bold relief the question o f where 
to establish an appropriate  balance in the law o f defam ation between 
freedom  of speech and the protection o f the individual from  adverse 
com m ent and criticism. Regrettably, the C ourt tipped the balance 
alarm ingly in the direction o f  the confining o f free speech and public 
debate on issues o f political and social significance. All o f  the judges in 
the Suprem e C ourt agreed that the burden  o f p roof in fair com m ent lies 
with the defendant. T hey parted company on the cardinal issue o f  how 
much freedom  a new spaper publisher o r editor enjoys in publishing the 
views o f others on public issues with which he does not agree, and which 
may be strong enough to be defam atory.
The circum stances o f this case and the issue before the court 
involved very serious policy considerations. Remarkably, the majority 
chose to ignore these entirely. In the judgem ents o f both Ritchie and 
M artland J.J., the main issue was confined to w hether the trial judge was 
right on the evidence before him to refuse to instruct the ju ry  on fair 
com m ent. Both concluded that he was. Both judges found as a m atter o f  
principle that a publisher cannot rely on the defense o f  fair com m ent if 
he personally does not believe in the tru th  o f the com m ent, and cannot 
dem onstrate that the original w riter has that honest belief. In their 
m inds this followed necessarily from a succession o f decisions requiring 
p roof by the defenden t o f “honest b e lie f’ on his part when relying on 
fair com m ent. They concluded the publisher o f a letter can be in no 
better position than the writer. However, the only reference to a possible 
policy issue occurred at the close o f Mr. Justice Ritchie’s judgem ent 
w here he suggested that nothing in the principle followed prevents a 
new spaper from  publishing letters with which it disagrees, o r prom oting 
a candid exchange o f  opposing views on the conduct o f a public figure. 
T he  condition is, o f course, that the m aterial is not defam atory. H ere 
there is no evidence o f sensitivity to the great difficulties which this 
principle raises for the press, nor recognition o f the hom ogenization o f 
opinion on political and social m atters which it implies.
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By contrast, Dickson J. for the m inority took time to discuss fully 
the policy factors before articulating the principle to be applied. In  what 
is, by any standards, one o f the most socially sensitive statem ents to 
em anate from  a C anadian judge  in recent years, he set out the 
implications for both the press and society in general o f  adopting a 
theory which identifies publisher and writer in these cases. A fter noting 
that letters columns are designed to stimulate uninhibited debate on 
every public issue, and that any identity o f  the editor with all o f  those 
views would be undesirable, if not impossible, he examined the social 
context in which the issue arises.
It is not only the right but the duty o f  the press, in pursuit o f  its legitimate 
objectives, to act as a sounding board for the free flow o f  new and different 
ideas. It is one o f  the few means o f  getting the heterodox and controversial 
before the public. Many o f the unorthodox points o f view get newspaper 
space through letters to the editor. It is one o f  the few ways in which the 
public gains access to the press. By these means, various points o f  view, old 
and new grievances and proposed remedies get aired. The public interest is 
incidentally served by providing a safety valve for people.69
He went on to show the sobering consequences o f  forcing newspapers to 
publish only that with which they can identify. He did so, acutely 
conscious o f  the economic forces in this country which have 
progressively decreased the num ber o f new spapers published.
Newspapers will not be able to provide a forum for disemination o f ideas if 
they are limited to publishing opinions with which they agree. If editors arc 
faced with the chance o f  publishing only those letters which espouse their 
own particular ideology, or being without defence if sued for defamation, 
democratic dialogue will be stilled. Healthy debate will likely be replaced by 
the m onotonous repetition o f majoritarian ideas and conformity to accepted 
taste. In one-newspaper-towns, o f  which there are many, competing ideas will 
no longer gain access. Readers will be exposed to a single political, economic 
and social point o f  view. In a public controversy, the tendency will be to 
suppress those letters with which the editor is not in agreement. . . .70
Having developed a public policy argum ent which clearly shows a 
high level o f sensitivity to the needs o f contem porary Canadian society, 
he found that the law accommodated and reflected his v^vvs on the 
policy factors. He noted the support in the leading texts and cases for 
the contention that the determ ination o f w hether a comment is fair is an 
objective one o f assessing whether a person, however prejudiced his 
views may be, could honestly subscribe to that point o f view, and that 
this determ ination is not to be confused with the subjective issue o f 
w hether the publisher was actuated by malice. In a situation in which the 
writer and publisher o f a letter are d ifferent people, the defence o f fair 
com m ent is available to the publisher if the com m ent satisfies the 
objective test, and no malice can be attributed to him in publishing it. 
T h e  fact that the writer may be acting maliciously is not relevant, as long
stlbid., at 96.
,0lbid., at 96-7.
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as the publisher was unaw are o f  that fact. T his view o f the law' seems to 
the w riter to preserve the defence in its traditional form, and to apply its 
two elem ents in a rational and fair way to two parties who have 
contributed to the publication o f  defam atory rem arks, but who normally 
cannot beidentified with each other. T h e  result is that the new spaper 
publisher and ed itor are not forced into the position o f reluctant censors 
and freedom  vigorously to debate public issues is preserved. T his 
freedom  is im portant at all levels o f  the political process. It is 
particularly im portant at the local level w here a significant num ber o f 
decisions affect the day-to-day lives o f  citizens.
Predictably the Chemeskey decision caused great alarm  and 
consternation amongst the m em bers o f  the press. However, reaction was 
not confined to them . It offended the opinions o f many others with a 
keen interest in preserving free speech and m aintaining the broadest and 
most candid canvassing o f  public issues. For the latter, the amjority opinion 
had sobering implications which went far beyond the context ol the 
Chemeskey case. It was observed that the principle espoused by the 
majority could extend to any m edium  in which com m ents published o r 
broadcast did not represent the views o f the publisher o r broadcaster. 
Potentially, it em braces “hotline” and opinion program s on radio and 
television and a wide range o f prin ted  materials, including magazines, 
articles, and books. In each instance, the publisher who dissem inated 
independent com m ent could not breathe confidently unless he 
established that he honestly shared that opinion, o r if he did not, that 
it was honestly held by the com m entator.
T hese b roader considerations led law reform  bodies in two 
Canadian jurisdictions, O ntario  and Alberta, to consider the problem  
and to recom m end an am endm ent to defam ation legislation designed to 
protect publishers in cases like this. T h e  O ntario  and Alberta 
com m issioners to the Uniform  Law C onference recom m ended to the 
1979 C onference that the am endm ent read:
8.1 Where the defendant published defamatory matter that is an opinion 
expressed by another person, a defence o f  fair comment shall not fail for the 
reason only that the defendant or the person who expressed the opinion or 
both, did not hold the opinion, if a person could honestly hold the opinion.71
Some concern was expressed at the C onference that this form ulation 
m ight go too far in the protection afforded , for it m ight cover a 
publisher even if he knew that the au tho r did not hold the opinion 
stated. As a result a slightly d ifferen t am endm ent was adopted:
8.1(1) Where the defendant published alleged defamatory matter that is an 
opinion expressed by another person, a defence o f  fair comment shall not fail 
for the reason only that the defendant did nothold the opinion if,
(a) the defendant did not know that the person expressing the opinion  
did not hold the opinion; and
T,See d rau g h t re p o rt on  The Rule in Chemeskey, (E dm onton: In s titu teo f Law Research, 1979), at 9.
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(b) a person could honestly hold the opinion.
(2) For the purposes o f  this section, the defendant is not under a duty to 
inquire into whether the person expressing the opinion does or does not hold 
the opinion.71
This form ulation has subsequently been accepted as the basis for 
recom m endations for changing the law in A lberta.73 It is to be hoped 
that each province will enact such a rem edial provision. T h e  Chemeskey 
decision throws the balance o f interests in the law o f  defam ation 
dangerously out o f  kilter. This is a balance which has been painstakingly 
built up  by the judges for a century and which reflects a rem arkable 
degree o f consensus on the dangers o f bridling candid public com m ent. 
T h at it should be disturbed in an era when there is evidence that we are 
increasingly becoming the passive receptacles o f  printed and broadcast 
pabulum  is distressing.
A defence which has recently been argued successfully in a case 
involving defam ation in the m unicipal arena is that o f  consent. For some 
time it had been assum ed on the basis o f English authority that a person 
could consent to the publication o f a defam atory statem ent and so 
effectively preclude him self from subsequently suing for it. In Chapman 
v. Ellesmere74 the plaintiff was taken to have consented to the publication 
o f the report o f  an enquiry concerning him conducted by the Jockey 
Club. T h e  report to his m ind contained an innuendo o f im proper 
conduct. The status o f  the defence in C anada and its ambit were, 
however, uncertain. This uncertainty may have been resolved by the 
judgem ent o f Mr. Justice M acPherson o f the Saskatchewan C ourt o f  
Q ueen’s Bench in the ra ther bizarre case o f Jones v. Brooks. 75 The 
plain tiff was a lawyer in private practice whose services were retained 
from  time to time by the municipality in which he had a branch office. 
He was asked to assist in facilitating an agreem ent for the sale o f  land 
owned by the municipality to a com pany which wanted to develop it. At 
the time o f the contract the com pany was not yet incorporated. T h e  
contract which was executed by both parties contem plated that the 
plain tiff would act for both. Subsequently, the p lain tiffs association with 
the com pany strengthened, for he became secretary-treasurer and a 
director. None o f this was revealed to the town for which he was 
carrying out o ther legal work. He was subsequently advised by the town 
adm inistrator that his association with the municipality was being 
term inated. It transpired  that the town had sought independent legal 
advice regarding its position un d er the contract and had been advised 
that its legal position was shaky in a num ber o f  respects. After the 
term ination o f his association with the municipality the plaintiff found
74[I932] 2. k .B . 4SI (C.A.).
"(1974), 45 1) 1. R. (,Hd) 4 1S (Sask. Q.B.).
72lbid., at 10.
73Sufrrii. footnote 71.
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that his business in the town was declining and heard rum ours that he 
was being disparaged in certain quarters. He thereupon retained the 
services o f two private detectives who were dispatched with hidden tape 
recorders to interview the defendants, the mayor and two councillors. 
All th ree men m ade statem ents which were defam atory o f the plaintiff. 
In the action which the latter brought for defam ation, the ju d g e  decided 
that the fact that the statem ents had been m ade to agents o f  the plaintiff 
did not gainsay its publication. However, his action could not succeed 
because he had consented to the statem ents being made. T h e  plaintiff 
“had good reason when he sent the detectives to anticipate that the 
response by the defendants to the inquiries m ight be defam atory”.76 T o  
his m ind this was the essence o f  volenti — “the knowing consent o f the 
plaintiff to the defen d an t’s w rong which the plaintiff expected”.77
TO SUE OR NOT TO SUE
T he cynic might be forgiven for characterizing the defam ation suit 
as a fool's paradise. Certainly the com bined wisdom o f  those who have 
been active in defam ation litigation over the years would suggest that 
such actions should not be launched lightly. While it may appear to the 
potential plaintiff that this is the only way to vindicate his character, he 
should be m ade to recognize that the law contains a num ber o f  
substantive and procedural pitfalls which may frustrate the endeavour 
and that even a successful suit may be a dubious victory if it has m eant 
fu rth e r scrutiny o f and publicity about his repu ta tion .78 This counsel o f  
restraint may be m ore difficult to accept in the heady environm ent o f 
municipal politics than elsewhere, but no less apposite.
T he  legal system is, o f  course, sensitive to the dangers o f  proceeding 
to trial in defam ation cases. While it has stopped short o f  m andating the 
use o f apology o r retraction, it does recognize that both o f these 
devices may be useful in neutralizing the “sting” o f a defam atory 
statem ent. Unless relations between the parties have reached such a low 
ebb that this type o f accommodation is impossible, both should be 
encouraged to consider seriously disposing o f  the m atter in this m anner. 
From the p lain tiffs point o f view it may provide the m ental and 
em otional satisfaction he needs. From that o f  the defendant it 
dem onstrates his good faith and concern to set the record straight.
at 420.
771 but., at 420.
7"A good exam ple o f  what m ight be described as a p la in tiffs  "defam ation wish" is the recen t M anitoba 
case o f  Syms v. Warren ( l ‘*76), 71 D.L.R. (3d) 558 (Man. Q .B .) in which the plaintiff, the C hairm an o f  
the L iquor C on tro l Com m ission, about whom false rum ours were spread  concerning  an im paired 
d riv ing  charge, went on an open line show to talk about the  issue and the investigations which had 
cleared him o f  any w rongdoing. An un iden tified  caller m ade new allegations against him. T h e  radio 
station was found  liable for not using its delayed action system to  stop the  com m ent from  the caller. 
How ever, the  p la in tiffs  dam ages o f  $2,000 were clearly affected by the fact that he had foolishly agreed  
to go on  the  air.
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For the defendant, it is im portant to recognize that for an apology 
to be effective it must be genuine, involving a withdrawal o f charges and 
a statem ent o f  regret for m aking them. T h e  character o f an apology and 
how a grudging  attitude on the part o f  the defendan t may backfire 
featured in the recent British Columbia case o f Thompson v. N.L. 
Broadcasting L td . 79 I'he plaintiff who was the mayor o f Kamloops was 
seeking reelection. T h e  defendants on th ree d ifferen t occasions 
broadcast editorials which falsely accused the Mayor o f firing the 
adm inistrative staff at city hall and o f overbilling for travel expenses. 
T h e  day after the first editorial the plaintiff was perm itted to broadcast 
a rebuttal. A so-called apology was broadcast six weeks after the second 
editorial and no apology o r retraction followed the th ird . T h e  “apology" 
which was broadcast repeated the charges, and the Mayor’s rejoinders 
and merely concluded “We are p repared  to accept Mayor T hom pson’s 
answ er”. Mr. Justice Schulz found inter alia that the apology was not a 
full apology, nor a p roper retraction. T he  defendant should have 
adm itted “that the charge was unfounded, that it was m ade without 
p roper inform ation, under an entire m isapprehension o f the real 
facts . . . and that he [regretted] that it was published . . .”.80 It seems 
clear that this grudging attem pt at an apology was a factor in persuading 
the judge to award punitive dam agesof $2,500.
T he  tactical caution which is essential in defam ation actions is also 
underlined in the Thompson case. A m itigating factor in the assessment o f 
dam ages was that the p lain tiffs solicitor had gone out o f the way to give 
publicity to the defam ation o f his client.
CONCLUSION
As was stated at the outset, the environm ent o f municipal politics 
has been fertile ground for defam ation actions. Indeed, there is a 
sufficiently large group o f cases o f this type that many o f the m ajor 
substantive issues in this area o f  the law have been canvassed. T h e  use o f 
a functional setting brings a clearer focus to the issues with which the 
courts have to deal, and the weighing o f interests which they have to 
undertake in defam ation actions. At the same time, it is possible to 
highlight concepts and factors which are unique to the particular setting.
Municipal politics have in recent years provided a particularly good 
test bed for exam ining the underlying balance in the law o f  defam ation 
between freedom  o f speech and protection o f the individual from unfair 
com m ent. U nfortunately, there is evidence o f a cleavage o f  opinion on 
where the balance should rest. On the one hand we have the
7B(I976). I C .C .L T . 278 (B.C.S.C.).
nolbul . at 292.
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enlightened views o f  the House o f  Lords in Horrocks v. Lowe, 8' affirm ing 
the need to protect basic dem ocratic values o f  free and frank public 
com m ents and debate. On the o ther there is the indifference o f  lower 
C ourts in England and C anada in Campion82 and Prince George, 83 and o f  
the majority o f the Suprem e C ourt o f  C anada in Chemeskey8\  to those 
same values. It is im portant that where the balance has been upset it be 
corrected. In the case o f  the availability o f the defam ation action to 
governm ental entities, this may still be achieved by judicial determ ina­
tion at higher levels. With the application o f the defence o f fair 
com m ent to the publication o f independent opinion legislative 
intervention is essential.
O n a m ore positive note, the case law dem onstrates that the 
courts are generally quite realistic and sensitive in the way in which 
they determ ine what is o r is not defam atory, and the circum stances in 
which qualified privilege and fair com m ent are available in local 
governm ent settings. M oreover, the Prince George and Campion cases 
apart, there is evidence that the courts are attuned  to the realities o f  
applying the law o f defam ation to the municipal corporate entity. In 
particular, there is evidence that they appreciate the limits o f  corporate 
responsibility in relation to this tort action.
HXSupra, footnote 14.
82Supra. footnote 10.
*3.S'upra, footnote 8.
**Supra, footnote 68.
